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LESS THAN UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
JOHNT V. RYAN
During the year 1965, forty percent of the de-
fendants who pled not guilty to criminal charges'
in England were acquitted2 "Quite a lot of them",
according to the Home Secretary of England, were
known to be guilty "by everyone connected with
the case"; and among those who "got off", some
were the "centres of networks of criminal activi-
ties".3
In offering an explanation for England's high
percentage of acquittals, the Home Secretary, Mr.
Roy Jenkins, expressed the view that it was
through "the power to intimidate or corrupt
jurors".6 He proposed, as a remedy, that less than
unanimous jury verdicts be made permissible. A
bill to that effect was introduced in Parliament on
November 29, 1966. In article ten, it provides that
in a case where there are not less than eleven
jurors, 6 ten may render a valid verdict; and, if the
jury consists of ten persons, nine may agree on the
verdict. The bill also provides that:
A court shall not accept a majority verdict
140% of all persons who were arraigned on criminal
charges pled not guilty, thus, 16% of all those arraigned
were acquitted.
2 Devlin, Should The Jury System Be Reformed?, ThE
LIsrENBR (London), October 13, 1966, p. 523, col. 1.
3Address by Mr. Roy Jenkins to the House of Com-
mons, August 8, 1966.
4 Bribery of English jurors is said to be practiced
frequently. In one recent case, one jury had to be re-
placed because the defendants' associates were seen
approaching the jurors. Soon thereafter a replacementjuror was discharged because the police received in-
formation that he had been offered a bribe and was
considering it. On the same day another juror reported
that he was offered 600 pounds to bring in a verdict
favorable to the accused. Two weeks later another juror
was offered a bribe of 100 pounds. Of the five defendants
accused of conspiring to rob a bank, only one, the bank
messenger, was convicted. Tim TmiEs (London), De-
cember 13, 1966.
Address by Mr. Roy Jenkins, supra note 3.
'The jury in English criminal trials consists of
twelve jurors, but if a member of the jury discontinues
(due to illness, for example), the trial may, with the
defendant's consent, continue with a lesser number ofjurors. Address by Mr. Buck to the House of Commons,
August 8, 1966.
unless it appears to the court that the jury
have had not less than two hours for delibera-
tion or such longer period as the court thinks
reasonable having regard to the nature and
complexity of the case.7
An analysis of this proposal may be more mean-
ingful if we pause for a brief discussion of the Eng-
lish history of trial by jury.
Although the origin of the trial jury is not dear,
it did develop, in part, from the practice of inquisi-
tion which the Normans imposed upon the English
population during the Norman Conquest.8 The
King appointed certain persons to officially witness
all transactions of a commercial nature. These per-
sons would then be called upon to swear to the
facts if a dispute related to the transaction arose at
a later date.9 A modified version of this practice
was first introduced into criminal proceedings late
in the twelveth century. 0 The Crown appointed a
number of men from the neighborhood to state
under oath whether there were any persons in the
locality whom they suspected had committed a
crime. Those so accused would then be tried."
The traditional forms of trial in criminal cases
were trial by compurgation, 2 ordeal" or battle. 4
'Letter from Peter English, Lecturer in Criminal
Law at the University of Exeter, to the Journal of
Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Decem-
ber 6, 1966.
8 DEvLiN, TRIAL BY JURY 5 (8th ser. 1956); MoscH-
zIXER, TRIAL BY JURY §27(a) (2d ed. 1930); Inbau;
The Concept of "Fair Hearing" in Anglo-American Law,
31 TuL. L. Rnv. 67-68 (1956).
9MoscnzixaR, supra note 8 at §40-41.
10 The first recorded instance of the use of this device
was in a case in which the criminal was such a powerful
individual that no person would come forward and
accuse him. Wells, The Origin of the Petty Jury, 27
L.Q.R. 347 (1911).
n FORsYT=E, HISTORY Op TRIAL BY JURY 102-03(1875).
n In this form of trial, the jury consisted of twelve
character witnesses who testified to the credibility of the
oath of one or the other party to the litigation. MosCH-
ZmR, supra note 8 at §43-44. If the jurors did not
agree, more jurors were added until twelve voted for
one litigant. The first party to receive twelve votes won
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However, one could not claim a right to trial by
battle unless he was accused by an individual
rather than a compurgatory jury.'5 In 1166, the
Assize of Clarendon allowed presentment 6 by
compurgation, but restricted criminal trials to
trial by ordeal. 7 Then, in 1215, Pope Innocence
III prohibited trial by ordeal in Roman Catholic
nations,18 thus leaving one accused by present-
ment without a mode of trial to vindicate himself.
It was left to the judges to find a new method of
trial for presented defendants. The judges re-
sponded by bringing in the presentment jurors to
be the triers of fact. The compurgators were taken
to know the facts, and if they did not, they were
replaced by persons who did.'9 By the reign of
Edward the Third the trial jury and the grand jury
were separated, but the verdict continued to be
based upon the private knowledge of jurors who
were witnesses as well as fact-finders.' 0 As time
went on, the trial jury began to lose its characteris-
tic of being a testifier to the facts, and various rules
of evidence were evolved to constrain the jurors to
find their verdict solely on the evidence produced
in court.1 With this innovation" the trial jury ar-
rived at the stage of evolution at which we see it
today.
The English proposal, if effectuated, will change
a longstanding element of the Anglo-American
the suit. This practice was referred to as afforcing the
jury. MOSCHZIKER, supra at §86.
13 The parties to a trial by ordeal relied upon Divine
Intervention manifested by an omen or miracle to indi-
cate their guilt or innocence. For example, carrying a
heated iron without subsequent infection, or swallowing
cheese without choking, were signs that the defendant
was innocent. Inbau, supra note 8 at 67.
14 The accused had the right to meet the accuser in
physical combat to prove he was innocent. The theory
was that God would give victory to the combatant who
told the truth. Inbau, supra note 8 at 68.
"6 FORSYTHE, supra note 11 at 102-03.
16 A group in each district was appointed, whose duty
it was to find if there was anyone in the community
who was believed to be a criminal, and to report their
findings to the judge. This group was, in effect, a grand
jury. Inbau, supra note 8 at 69.
17 FoaSry ", supra note 11 at 102-03.
"8 DVLIN, supra note 8 at 9.
19 FoRsYrHE, supra note 11 at 161-62, 170.
20 FoRsYTIM, supra note 11 at 170-71.
21 McCART, TRIAL nY JUnRY 7 (1964).
22 English jurors were allowed to find a verdict on
their personal knowledge until the practice of attaint
was outlawed in Plea in Bushell's Case, 1 Vaugh Rep.
135 (1670). Attaint was a procedure by which the Crown
could punish jurors who refused to convict a guilty
man. However, if the jurors were assumed to find the
verdict by their own personal knowledge, then the
Crown could not so easily coerce the jury to convict
when they entertained a reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused. McCART, supra note 21 at 7;
FORSYTHE, supra note 11 at 136.
trial jury system." English common law at present
requires that there be twelve 4 men on a criminal
jury, and that all twelve agree upon the guilt of the
defendant."
Various reasons have been put forth to explain
why the unanimous verdict requirement arose. One
theory is that there were few legal and procedural
rules 6 to insure the defendant a fair trial before an
impartial panel of jurors, thus the practice of re-
quiring unanimity of the jurors to convict the de-
fendant was initiated to compensate for these
shortcomings." Another theory suggests that the
Crown often exerted great pressure to convict the
accused. To shift the pressure from themselves,
the judges" originated the unanimity rule." A
third theory recognizes the extremely cruel and
harsh penalties that the early law imposed upon
one convicted of a felony, and attributes the origin
of the rule to the desire of the judges to "give the
defendant a break".30
Probably none of these explanations3' is the cor-
rect one. In trial by compurgation twelve jurors
The unanimous jury verdict became mandatory in
England in 1367. 1 HoLa)SWoRTn, A HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW 318 (7th ed. 1956).
24 The number of jurors, twelve was adopted from
earlier forms of trial utilized by both the Saxons and the
Normans. DEvLiN, supra note 8 at 8; FORsYTHE, supra
note 11 at 199. Although some legal historians felt the
number was set at twelve because this was the number
frequently used in the Old and New Testaments, this
theory is presently in disrepute. See Haralson, Unani-
nous Jury Verdicts, 21 Miss. L. J. 191 (1950).
21 Under the old common law, a jury verdict of less
than twelve jurors was considered a nullity, and the
defendant was discharged. FoRYsTnE, supra note 11 at
200.
26 For example, the accused could be tortured to
force him to consent to a jury trial. He had no right to
counsel, to call witnesses to testify on his behalf, or to
challenge jurors. The jurors were allowed to obtain
extra-judicial evidence at their discretion. The rules of
evidence were nil. ORFiLD, CRnNAL. PROCEDURE
FROM ARREST To APPEAL 344-51 (1947); Wells, Early
Opposition to the Petty Jury in Criminal Cases, 30 L.Q.R.
102-09 (1914).
27 OR rETD, supra note 26 at 347-51; Haralson, supra
note 24 at 191.
2" At early common law the judges were allowed great
freedom in determining what the procedural and sub-
stantive rights of the accused were. See 1 S rEHEN, A
HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 451-54 (1883).
291 HoLDswoRTH, supra note 23 at 325; Haralson,
supra note 24 at 191. Some of the pressures applied to
these early juries were harsh, indeed. When the jury
retired to deliberate they were allowed neither food,
water, light, nor heat until they rendered a verdict. If
they failed to reach a verdict by the end of the assize,
they were carted along with the judge as he went to the
future assizes. If the Crown felt that a juror hadn't
rendered a proper verdict, he was attainted. DEVLIN,
supra note 8 at 50-51.
30 Haralson, supra note 24 at 191.
31 See Haralson, supra note 24 at 191; Wells, supra
note 26 at 97.
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were impaneled, but additional jurors were al-
lowed to join them until one party had twelve com-
purgators "voting" for his position.n As the func-
tion of the jury changed to judging credibility, the
practice of adding to the original twelve was
dropped, but the requirement that the Crown must
obtain twelve "votes" to convict the accused was
retained.D Thus unanimity, as it is known in
present-day criminal trials evolved from a system
which did not require unanimity, but only required
that the proper amount of evidence to support a
verdict be that twelve of the jurors on the panel
agree upon the verdict.
Although England, at present, requires a unani-
mous jury verdict in criminal trials, Scotland has
no such requirement. Scottish juries are composed
of fifteen members, eight of whom may find a
verdict.l
At first blush, one might view the Scottish "mere
majority" jury verdict to be unfair to the defend-
ant.n However, Scotland allows the jury to return
a verdict of "not proven". This verdict signifies
that there is great suspicion the accused is guilty
and only a faint doubt or a legal technicality keeps
the jury from convicting him.36 This intermediate
verdict stops compromise verdicts because it al-
lows the jury to truthfully attach the stigma of
guilt without depriving the accused of his freedom.
The jury is thus freed from the guilty-not guilty
dilemma.
The proposal to eliminate the unanimous jury
verdict requirement causes no great constitutional
problems in England. The English Constitution,
unlike the United States Constitution, was not
written at one time and approved by the populace.
It is a product of the common law, one precedent
building upon another.n This allows a flexible sys-
tem, which easily adopts to changing circum-
stances. Thus, the fundamental rights in the Eng-
12 DELVIN, supra note 8 at 48-49; Foas-mn, supra
note 11 at 199.
33The only explanation one can offer for the dis-
continuance of afforcing the jury is a historical one. The
compugatory jurors were actually witnesses to the facts.
To add jurors, then, added witnesses and contributed to
the pool of fact upon which the jurors could deliberate.
As the jury lost its testimentary capacity, afforcement
did not serve any purpose, and the practice was
dropped.
'
4 MCDONALD, CRaIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 559
(4th ed. Mitchell 1929).
35 In civil trials, the Scots use a jury of twelve, and
they must unanimously arrive at a verdict. FORSYTHE,
supra note 11 at 261.
36 FORsYTRE, supra note 11 at 282-88.
S1 nrH, THE CONSTITUTION, ITS STORY AND ITS
BATTLES 68 (1926); RmGES, CONSTnrrTiONAL LAW IN
ENGLAND 1 (3d ed. Williams 1922).
lish Constitutional system are those which the
people, at that moment, feel are fundamental.n On
the other hand, the United States Constitution
lists certain fundamental rights in perpetuity,
which may be interpreted and construed by the
courts to coincide with the times only to a limited
extent.
Whether a majority verdict rule could be
adopted in the United States depends, in the first
instance, upon whether the unanimous verdict in
criminal trials is required by the Constitution.
Article Three of the Constitution states that all
criminal trials (except impeachment cases) shall
be by jury.39 The Sixth Amendment also assures
the accused a trial by jury.40 The trial by jury that
is guaranteed by these two sections is said to be
that form of jury trial that existed at common law
at the time the Constitution was adopted.4' How-
ever, one may waive some of the concomitants of a
common law trial by jury.4' Thus the common law
number (twelve) may be waived and a lesser num-
ber may sit and decide the fate of the accused
without violating due process.43 Also, the entire
jury may be waived by the accused, and the judge
may render a verdict.4" Similarly, civil litigants are
allowed to waive their constitutional right to a
trial by jury.45 In addition, although the civil
litigant is given the right to a unanimous verdict
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he may
waive this right.46 If unanimity, an element of the
common law trial by jury, is waivable in civil ac-
tions, should it not be waivable also in criminal
trials?47
ISee WILiAMs, THE PROOF OF GUI T 1-14 (3d ed.
1963).
"U.S. CONST. AnT. 3 §2.
40 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an im-
partial jury... ." U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
4 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898).4 'Those which are not essential to due process. See
Comment, Waiver of Unanimity-Some Doubts About
Reasonable Doubt, 21 U. CHr. L. REv. 438-40 (1954).
However, there is dicta that unanimity was essential to
trial by jury at common law. Thus, although not es-
sential to due process, it is a necessity because it is
guaranteed by Article Three and the Sixth Amendment.
See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948) (dic-
tum); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) (dictum).
But see note 47 infra.
41 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930);
Williams v. United States, 332 F. 2d 36 (7th Cir. 1964).
"Wright v. United States, 165 F. 2d 405 (8th Cir.
1948); Fowler v. Hunter, 164 F. 2d 668 (10th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 868 (1948); Hrood v. United States,
152 F. 2d 431 (8th Cir. 1946).
41 American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464,
467 (1897); Kass v. Baskin, 164 F. 2d 513 (D.C. Cir.
1947).46 FED. R. Crv. P. 48.
47 ORpmriE, supra note 26 at 438 n. 641; Comment,
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Although the Supreme Court has never decided
this point, two federal circuit courts have, with
contrary results. The Sixth Circuit, in Hibdon v.
United States,48 held that the accused in a criminal
trial could not, under any circumstances, waive his
right to a unanimous verdict, since this right is an
"inescepable element of due process", 49 and is "in-
extricably interwoven with the required measure of
proof (beyond a reasonable doubt)."' 0 As an al-
ternative ground, the court held that, even if the
right were waivable, in this particular instance the
defendant had not freely given his consent to the
waiver.5' On the other hand, the First Circuit, in
Fournier v. Gonzales, 2 held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment53 does not require
a unanimous jury verdict in criminal trials." The
court went on to say that, upon waiver, a verdict
by less than all the jurors satisfies the requirement
that the prosecution prove the defendant guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 5
The question that arises when the accused waives
the unanimous verdict requirement in a federal
criminal proceeding, then, is whether a verdict by
less than all members of the jury allows the prose-
cution to obtain a conviction without proving the
supra note 42 at 438. The assumption is that a unan-
imous verdict is not essential to common law trial byjury, nor is it essential to due process. But see note 42
supra.
" 204 F. 2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953). The jury retired and
twenty-seven minutes thereafter informed the court
that it was hopelessly deadlocked. The judge, in the
presence of the jury, asked the defendant if he would
agree to allow the jury to bring a valid majority verdict.
He agreed, and subsequently, verdicts were returned
against him on two counts, 9-3 and 10-2.9 Id. at 838.50 Ibid.
1' Id. at 839. The suggestion emanated from thejudge, and the Circuit Court felt that the accused
accepted it because he didn't wish to be "at the mercy
of a judge whose suggestion to him to accept a majority
verdict was flouted".
12 269 F. 2d 26 (1st Cir. 1959). cert. denied, 359 U.S.
93 (1959). Puerto Rican Law [34 L.P.R.A. §612 (1956)]
allowed a verdict by nine of the twelve members of thejury to convict in felony cases. The defendant was con-
victed of first degree murder by a verdict of 10-2.
5 "IN] or be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.. ." U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
1 The Constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, both
in Article Three and in the Sixth Amendment, does not
apply to Puerto Rico. Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S.
298 (1921). Hence Fournier was decided solely on the
Fifth Amendment. Although the Hibdon case discussed
Article Three, the Sixth Amendment and Fed. R. Crim.
P. 31 (a) (which gives every defendant in a criminal
trial the right to a unanimous jury verdict), the court
based its holding on Fifth Amendment grounds.
5 Fournier v. Gonzales, supra note 52 at 29.
accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 If a
majority verdict does allow the defendant to be
convicted, although reasonable doubts have not
been dispelled, then the due process requirement,
that one may be convicted of a crime only if he has
been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,3
has not been satisfied. Conceptually the problem
devolves to the issue of whether the jury finds its
verdict as an entity,3 or as individuals. 5 If the
latter theory is accepted, 6 then the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not changed
by the number of jurors who must be convinced.
This becomes clear when one notes that the burden
would remain the same, to convince the individual
juror beyond a reasonable doubt. What would be
changed (as the number of jurors on the panel who
are to be convinced is reduced) is the burden of
persuasion because the prosecution needs to con-
vince a lesser number of persons."' However, if one
accepts the proposition that the jury arrives at its
verdict as an entiry,62 then the burden of proof
would be reduced if the prosecution does not have
to prove to all members of the jury that the de-
fendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
A mere lessening of the burden of persuasion
does not seem to be a violation of due process.
11 For an interesting discussion on this question by a
state court, see State v. Robbins, 176 Ohio St. 362,
199 N.E. 2d 742 (1964). In this case the defendant
waived his right to a jury trial and, under a state statute
agreed to be tried before a three-judge court. He was
convicted by a 2-1 decision. The court upheld the
conviction and stated that a majority verdict did not
contravene the requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.57 Here it is assumed that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is needed to satisfy due process. This is probably
the attitude of the present Supreme Court, although
there is copious dicta to support either side of the
argument. See Comment, 112 U. PA. L. R.v. 769-70
and n.n. 2-3.
This theory arose when trial by compurgation was
in full flower. The accused put himself "on the country",
and the jury's judgement was thought to be the judge-
ment of the neighborhood. This "oricular" characteriza-
tion was carried over when trial by jury evolved from
trial by compurgation. SPooNER, TRIAL BY JURY 132-33(1852).
19 The concept is fully discussed in Comment, supra
note 42 at 438.
10 This is probably the prevailing view. See generally
Annot., 137 A.L.R. 394 (1942).61 An instruction demanding that all the jurors must
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
does not necessarily indicate that the entity theory has
been adopted by the judge, since such an instruction
would be required if the unanimous verdict rule was in
force in that jurisdiction. Cf. State v. Robbins, cited at
note 56 supra.




When the jury consists of less than twelve mem-
bers," or when the accused consents to a bench
trial, the burden of persuasion is reduced because
the prosecution needs to convince less than twelve
persons. These lessenings of the burden of persua-
sion have been held not to violate due process."
Hence the Supreme Court has a theory upon which
they may rely if they wish to hold that a majority
verdict in a criminal trial does not reduce the
quantum of proof the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment imposes upon the prosecution.
Historically, it is apparent that unanimity is not
"inextricably interwoven with the required meas-
ure of proof""4 since the two arose for different
reasons and at different times. The unanimous
verdict requirement was in force long before the
reasonable doubt rule. The latter arose as a term of
art, used to instruct the jurors on the quantum of
proof needed to support a verdict of guilty.'$ If
reasonable doubt is merely a measure of the proof,
then it has no bearing upon the process by which a
reasonable doubt is overcome."
If one adopts the entity theory, the reasonable
doubt of one juror becomes a reasonable doubt of
the jury as an entiry. If this is true, then, logically,
the accused should be acquitted, because the entire
jury reasonably doubts the guilt of the accused.
But, in practice, this is not the case; unless all the
jurors as individuals have a reasonable doubt as to
the guilt of the defendant, the jury is said to be
hung, and the defendant may be subjected to a
trial de novo.Y
In summary, it seems that the jurors need not
all be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt to
satisfy the requirements of due process. And it
seems that the jury does not find its verdict as an
entity. Thus the accused can waive his right to a
unanimous jury verdict in a federal court.61
A waiver is consensual, however, and the Eng-
lish proposal forces the defendant to accept a ma-
jority jury verdict. May an accused be similarly
deprived of the right to a unanimous jury verdict in
a United States federal court, without his consent?
6See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 278 (1930);
United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F. 2d 721 (3d Cir.
1949).
4Hibdon v. United States, 204 F. 2d 834, 836 (6th
Cir. 1953).
65 Comment, supra note 57 at 771.
66 Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 839 (1949); People v. De-
Cillis, 14 N.Y. 2d 750 (1964).
67 Comment, supra note 57 at 772 n. 22.
"It is doubtful that intelligent counsel would allow
his client to make such a waiver.
If due process does not require a unanimous ver-
dict, then unanimity is not essential to trial by
jury at common law," and to deprive one of his
right" to a unanimous verdict would be constitu-
tionally permissible.
Assuming that "due process" as used in the
Fourteenth Amendmentn carries the same mean-
ing as it does in the Fifth Amendment,72 the ac-
cused in a state criminal proceeding could similarly
be relegated to a majority verdict without his con-
sentY3 But, if the two Amendments differ in scope,74
then an inquiry must be made as to whether the
Fourteenth Amendment requires a unanimous ver-
dict in state criminal proceedings.
The scope of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is hotly disputed, but it is
generally agreed that at least some parts of the Bill
of Rights are incorporated in itY5 Although some
of the present Justices of the Supreme Court are
of the opinion that all eight amendments of the
Bill should be included,7 others are of the opinion
that not all the Bill of Rights should be incorpo-
rated in the Amendment 7 Neither Article Three
6There is much dicta that trial by jury itself is not
necessary for due process. See Mort, DuE PRocEss oF
LAw 209-13 and n.n. 4-15. Granting this, surely a unan-
imous jury verdict can not be essential to due process.70 One must agree that the "trial by jury" which the
Constitution guarantees the accused is that which
existed at the time the Constitution was adopted. How-
ever, one may argue that only those parts of a common
law jury trial that were essential to it were intended
to be guaranteed. One then further argues that a unan-
imous verdict was not considered essential by the
framers, and that they did not intend to form proce-
dural straight jackets which would bind future courts to
the outmoded. The flexibility underlying our Constitu-
tional system forces one to reach this answer.
7 "(N) or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law...
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV §2.
2 "(N or be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. . Y" U.S. CoNsT. A MND. V.73 Discussed at text with notes 56-66 supra.74 "Due process", as used in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, is presently much wider than the Fifth Amend-
ment in scope. It has been defined as "all the funda-
mental principals of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions". Hebert
v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
75 For an interesting discussion on the relative merits
of the two schools, see Mr. justice Goldberg's con-
curring opinion, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 410-14
(1965).76 Mr. justice Black is the champion of this school of
thought. Cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 49, 68-
123 (1946) (dissent). Probably Mr. justice Douglas
agrees with his position. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 345-47 (1963) (concurring opinion).77 Mr. Justice Harlan is the leading light of this
school. Cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 44-46 (1963)
(concurring opinion); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
410-414 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
[1967
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nor the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by
jury has been incorporated, as yet, into the Four-
teenth Amendment.7 8 What has been incorporated
into the Amendment are those rights fundamental
and essential to a "fair trial"Y The states, it has
been said, may partially or completely do away
with trial by jury without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment.80 Taking this obiter at face value,
those states whose constitutions authorize ma-
jority verdicts in criminal trials have initiated the
practice by legislation, while other states have
amended their constitutions to allow majority
verdict.8'
Are majority verdicts valid under the United
States Constitution when, in either a state or a
Federal criminal proceeding, the accused does not
consent to such a less than unanimous jury verdict?
When considered in the abstract, in the light of
legal history, precedent, and Constitutional guar-
antees, the answer seems to be that such verdicts
should be valid. But when one notes the recent
broadening of the rights of the accused, both in-
side and outside the courtroom, 3 the chances are
slim that history and prior decision will be the
basis upon which the Court will actually base its
decision. 3 In the final analysis, the outcome of the
case will depend upon the personal philosophy of
the justices sitting at the time.M However, doc-
trinally, the court is not forced to the decision that
majority jury verdicts in criminal trials are re-
quired by the Constitution.
78 SeeFayv. NewYork, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (dictum);
Jordan v. Commonwealth, 225 U.S. 167 (1912) (dic-
tum); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (dictum).79 E.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege
against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright 372
U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (right to counsel).
80 See cases cited note 78 supra81l Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon
and Texas all allow less than unanimous jury verdicts
in certain criminal cases. Connecticut, Ohio and New
York allow the accused to waive a jury trial in favor of a
three-judge panel; a verdict by two of the judges is
sufficient to convict.
8 See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
83 Compare Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378
U.S. 52 (1964), and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964),
with Knapp v. Schweitzee, 357 U.S. 371 (1958) and
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) and Feldman
v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) and United States
v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931) and Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).84The "incorporation school" will do battle with the
"fundamental principles of justice" school. Whichever
school has the most adherents will carry the day. The
fundamental principles school has Justices Harlan,
Clark, Stewart and White in its camp. Cf. Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 409-10 (1965) (Stewart, J., con-
curring); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495-496
If a less than unanimous jury verdict rule can
be adopted by our federal and state courts, the next
inquiry is, should it be adopted?
Those who favor the retention of the unanimous
verdict rule claim that it is essential to justice: it
promotes deliberation by imposing a delay;85 it
allows a platform for the intelligent dissenter; 6 it
makes a trial more palatable to the community and
to the losing party; it protects the accused from
unjust and undesirable laws;88 and, finally, it pro-
tects the accused by lessening the influence a biased
juror may have upon the rest of the panel.83
Those who advocate that a majority verdict
should be sufficient to convict base their position
upon the following arguments: the verdict of the
trial jury is the product of compromise anyway the
jury only superficially adheres to the unanimity,
requirement;9 one stubborn or corrupt juror can
(1964) (White, J., with whom Clark, J., and Stewart,
J., join, dissenting); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14-
33. (1964) (Harlan, J., with whom Clark, J., joins,
dissenting).
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas seem to
be strict incorporationists. See note 76 supra.
Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan he-
long to neither school. They feel that "due process"
does not include all the first eight amendments, but that
it does include rights not enumerated in the Bill of
Rights. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-
99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., with whom Warren, C. J., and
Brennan, J., join, concurring); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1-14 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J., in which
Warren, C. J., joins); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 345-47 (1963) (Warren, C. J., concurring).
Mr. Justice Fortas has not yet conclusively demon-
strated with whom he sides in the battle. However, he
has indicated that he follows the theory adhered to by
the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan. Cf. Brown v.
Louisiana 383 U.S. 131-143 (opinion of Fortas, J.) and
151-68 (Black, J., dissenting).
Viewing the recent explosion of rights granted a
defendant to insure him a "fair trial", one may suspect
that any tampering with the jury system will be frowned
upon by a majority of the present Court. See notes 82-
83 supra. However, with all these "new" safeguards, the
Supreme Court may be persuaded that a majority ver-
dict would not deprive the defendant of a "fair" trial.
85 Carlee v. State, 162 Miss. 263, 139 S. 618 (1932);
HART, LONG Lxv THE AmERICAN JURY 66 (1964);
MosczlsxR, TRIAL BY JURY §410-11 (2d rev. ed.
1930).
86 SToREY, THE REFO RI OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 191
(1931).
V SPOONER, TRIAL BY JURY 132-33 (1852).88Id. at 211-21; Address by Seasongood to the
Cincinnati Conference on Trial by Jury, Feb. 27, 1937
in 11U. Cisc.L. REv. 139 (1937).
9 Linn, Changes in Trial by Jury, 3 TErn'. L.Q. 12-13
(1928-29).
90 "It is very difficult, if not impossible, to realize
the theory in practice.... A kind of formal 'give-and-
take' is thus encouraged, which approaches the 'mere
acquiescence' that has been condemned (by the courts);
and this shades off into. . . more or less formal com-
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cause a mistrial;91 one juror can veto (in effect)
legislation passed by the majority of the people;9 2
the present rule allows the jury to temper unjust
lawss when strict enforcement would better serve
the public by rousing it to reject the statute; 4 and
finally, many of the most crucial decisions in our
present day system of government are arrived at by
less than unanimous agreement of the determining
group.
95
promises.. ." Barrett, The Jury's Agremment-Ideal and
Real, 20 ORE. L. REv. 190, 195 (1941). See OSBORN,
THE MIN O THE JUROR 166 (1937).
11 ORPIELD, CRnaAL PROCEDURE PROM ARREST TO
APPEAL 438 (1947). But some authorities feet that the
intransigent juror is a rarity, and does not occur often
enough to force a change in the present unanimity rule.
E.g., DEVLIN, TRIAL By JURY 56-57 (8th ser. 1956).
2Broeder, The Fiunctions of the Jury-Facts or Fic-
lion? 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 388-89 (1954).
11 However, one school of opinion extols this as the
finest feature of the unanimity rule. See authorities
cited in note 88 supra. "Patriots and martyrs were never
hung, burnt, or beheaded by the Jury of England, but
by the arbitrary provision of the law by the judges."
AUSTIN, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTISE
OP THE LAW 59-60 (1819).91 If these laws are left on the books, they will be only
occasionally enforced to "get" someone the public
feels should be punished. However, the public is, itself,
always threatened when a law is used discriminately,
because it may be utilized to penalize members of the
public who are not criminals, but merely members of an
unpopular group. See PARmTTER, TBE VALUE OF
TRIAL BY JURY 1-2, 13 (1938).99For example, impeachment of the president of the
United States or whether to become a combatant in a
None of the arguments on either side demon-
strate that unanimity is or is not essential to trial
by jury.9 But, on balance, the arguments on be-
half of majority jury verdicts carry more weight.
The Home Secretary of England wishes to enact a
majority verdict rule because jurors are being in-
timidated or corrupted, especially by those in or-
ganized crime.P Since the United States has or-
ganized crime," one may assume jury tempering
goes on in the United States as well.P
Today, in contrast to earlier days, numerous
safeguards exist for the protection of the innocent
person on trial.i°0 It has become increasingly
difficult to convict, and crime is rampant. Has not
the time come to remove the anachronistic and un-
realistic requirement of unanimity?
war. In fact, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, which, to a large effect, determine the
basic rights an individual may have in our society, de-
cides by a mere majority.
16 Since the jury deliberates in secret, and renders no
opinion, many of the arguments buttressing either side
are speculative, at best.
1 Address by Mr. Roy Jenkins to the House of Com-
mons, August 8, 1966.
Is England had no large organized crime problem until
it legalized gambling in 1961. There are indications that,
at the time, the American "Syndicate" extended itself
to England and today forms a large percentage of
England's organized criminals. Cf. Chicago Tribune,
Feb. 25, 1967, p. 14, col. 2.
10 This is not to say that jury tampering its exclu-
sively a tool of the organized criminal.
100 See notes 82-83, 91 supra.
[1967
